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2
We therefore venture (at what we would term the eleventh hour) to ask His Majesty's Government, instead of forcing the Chinese Government and the American Government to solicit this information from the Russian and Japanese Governments, to act as a friendly mediator in the matter, and to obtain on our behalf a definite statement from the Japanese and Russian Governments as to what is the moderate participation in this scheme that they desire, and to inform us accordingly, as we have reason to believe, provided this participation is a reasonable and businesslike one, and definitely described, that it will be granted.
In the event of the participation demanded by either or both Governments being clearly excessive and unreasonable, will His Majesty's Government use their hest endeavours to support our American allies and ourselves with the Chinese Govern- ment?
We are, &c. (Pauling and Co., Limited),
J. M. SCOTT, Secretary.
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majestys Government.]
6486
[B]
CHINA RAILWAYS.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[6157]
(No. 71.)
No. 1.
Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Bryce,
SECTION 3.
[February 16.]
RAGE 4 MAR 10)
Sir,
Foreign Office, February 16, 1910. THE United States Ambassador told me yesterday that Mr. Knox was much surprised to hear that we had made a representation at Peking adverse to the Chinchow-Aigun Railway proposal, as he had understood that we were prepared to support it. Mr. Knox wished to know what was the explanation of this change of attitude on our part, and what our attitude would now be towards the project.
I explained to the Ambassador in general terms what had passed, but asked him to call again when I had been able to look up the history of the whole project; and I told him that I would then give him a copy of the 1899 agreement withi Russia, of which he had not previously heard.
When the Ambassador came again to-day, I explained that we had originally expressed our pleasure at the co-operation of British and American financiers in a railway project to which in principle we were favourable. But we had stated that in view of Japanese interests we could not press this project at Peking until Japanese participation had been arranged. We had therefore enquired whether the United States Government would be favourable to Japanese participation. As a result, we had both recommended Japanese participation to the Chinese at Peking. Pending the settlement of this point, we ourselves were unable to do anything further, though the American Legation had continued to support the project, and had secured an ediet in favour of it which had not been communicated to us by the Chinese.
Meanwhile, the Russians had heard of the project and had been told that we had supported it. M. Isvolsky at once pointed out that the railway was intended to extend to the Russian frontier, and that it would raise serious strategical, as well as economic, questions for Russia. He had reproached us for not having told him about the matter before, and had said that we had broken the 1899 agreement between Great Britain and Russia by supporting the project. I had replied that, as a matter of fact, we had not supported the project at Peking, because we had been unable to do so until the settlement of the point as to Japanese participation. M. Isvolsky had then intimated that, as the proposed railway would in its final form affect Russian interests quite as much as Japanese interests, it would be only reasonable that we should say as much at Peking on behalf of Russia as we had already said on behalf of Japan. This had seemed to me to be reasonable, and I had warned the Chinese Government of the impossibility of ignoring Russian and Japanese interests and of arriving at a final settlement without consulting the Russian and Japanese Govern-
ments.
• Any misunderstanding at Washington must have arisen through my omitting to inform Mr. Whitelaw Reid here that we had actually made this representation at Peking, as well as of the position in which we were placed by the 1899 agreement with Russia. Had the point occurred to me, I would have informed him sooner, though I had already, on the 7th February, pointed out to him what our attitude was with regard to Russia.
Further reference to the papers has reminded me that we had instructed His Majesty's chargé d'affaires on the 5th instant to inform his American colleague of the warning to be given to the Chinese Government.
As to the 1899 agreement, I had told M. Isvolsky that it seemed to have lapsed when the Russians asked for participation in a railway in the Yang-tsze region. To this M. Isvolsky had replied that the Russian request for participation in a railway in which Great Britain was already participating and to which we were favourable was not so important a matter as the giving of our support to a project for a railway in the north that would actually touch the Russian frontier, a railway in which Russia was not participating and by which her interests might be damaged. There was some
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